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Abstract 
This paper studies structural transformation and its implications for productivity growth in the BRIC 
countries based on a new database that provides trends in value added and employment at a detailed 
35-sector level. We find that for China, India and Russia reallocation of labour across sectors is 
contributing to aggregate productivity growth, whereas in Brazil it is not. However, this result is 
overturned when a distinction is made between formal and informal activities. Increasing formalization 
of the Brazilian economy since 2000 appears to be growth-enhancing, while in India the increase in 
informality after the reforms is growth-reducing.  
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A central insight in development economics is that development entails structural change. Structural 
change, narrowly defined as the reallocation of labour across sectors, featured prominently in the early 
literature on economic development by Kuznets (1966). As labour and other resources move from 
traditional into modern economic activities, overall productivity rises and incomes expand. The nature 
and speed with which structural transformation takes place is considered one of the key factors that 
differentiate successful countries from unsuccessful ones (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). Therefore, new 
structural economists argue that production structures should be the starting point for economic 
analysis and the design of appropriate policies (Lin, 2011).1 
Technological change typically takes place at the level of industries and induces differential patterns of 
sectoral productivity growth. At the same time, changes in domestic demand and international trade 
patterns drive a process of structural transformation in which labour, capital and intermediate inputs 
are continuously relocated between firms, sectors and countries (Kuznets, 1966; Chenery et al., 1986; 
Harberger, 1998, Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). One of the best documented patterns of structural change is 
the shift of labour and capital from production of primary goods to manufacturing and later to services. 
This featured prominently in explanations of divergent growth patterns across Europe, Japan and the 
U.S. in the post-WW-II period (Denison, 1967; Maddison, 1987; Jorgenson and Timmer, 2011). Another 
finding is that in low-income countries the level and growth rate of labour productivity in agriculture is 
considerably lower than in the rest of the economy, reflecting differences in the nature of the 
production function, in investment opportunities, and in the rate of technical change (Syrquin, 1984; 
Crafts, 1984, Gollin et al. 2011). Together these findings suggest a potentially important role for 
resource allocation from lower to higher productive activities to boost aggregate productivity growth. 
Based on the sector database of Timmer and de Vries (2009), the IADB (2010) and McMillan and Rodrik 
(2011) found that structural change was contributing to productivity growth in Asia; whereas it was 
absent or even reducing growth in Africa and Latin America. Also Bosworth and Collins (2008) found 
strong growth-enhancing structural change in China and India. 
So far, however, analyses of structural change in developing countries are constrained by the availability 
of detailed sector data, obscuring a proper assessment of the role of structural transformation in driving 
aggregate productivity growth. Typically, data is only available for broad sectors such as agriculture, 
industry and services, hiding important reallocations that can take place, for example from low-
productive garment making to high-productive transport equipment manufacturing. Also a distinction 
between formal and informal activities within a sector, say informal and formal textile manufacturing 
may have important consequences for our understanding of the effects of structural change on 
aggregate growth. Productivity growth in the formal sector could go hand-in-hand with a substitution of 
capital for labour and thereby a push of employment into low-productive informality, but such 
reallocation effects would not be picked up in an aggregate analysis.  
This paper addresses these issues by studying the role of structural change for growth in four large 
developing countries, the BRIC countries: Brazil, China, India and Russia. The acronym BRIC was invented 
by Jim O’Neill in 2001 to group these four developing countries because of their recent growth spurts 
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and potential for future domination of the world economy due to their population and economic size. 
Economic growth in China and India in particular has been well above world average, and provides a 
foundation for the growth of world GDP. Figure 1 shows that the share of the BRICs in world GDP 
increased from about 15 per cent in 1980 to 27 per cent in 2008.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
To analyse the role of structural change in BRICs’ growth, we present a harmonized time-series database 
of value added and persons engaged with a common detailed 35 sector classification (ISIC revision 3). 
The dataset builds upon the time-series of broad sectors for China and India by Bosworth and Collins 
(2008) and for Asian and Latin American countries by Timmer and de Vries (2009). It adds further detail 
and harmonizes the measurement of output and employment across countries, which is important for a 
comparative and more fine-grained analysis of economic growth and production. Data on number of 
workers is based on the broadest employment concept, including self-employment, family-workers and 
other informal workers. The dataset is based on a critical assessment of the coverage and consistency of 
concepts and definitions used in various primary data sources. The sector database is publicly available.2 
Using the canonical shift-share method we find strong growth-enhancing effects of structural change in 
China, India, and Russia, but not in Brazil. This confirms the findings of McMillan and Rodrik (2011) and 
Bosworth and Collins (2008). However, we show that these results are sensitive to the level of 
aggregation by performing the same decomposition at various levels of aggregation such as 3, 10 and 35 
industries. This is true in particular, when a distinction is made between formal and informal activities 
within sectors. To this end, we use detailed national accounts data for India, and nationally 
representative surveys of the informal sector in Brazil. For example, in India the informal sector 
accounts for up to 30 per cent of manufacturing’s value added, compared with an 80 per cent share in 
employment, indicating large differences in productivity between formal and informal activities. Our 
analysis suggests that in India the expansion of informal activities after the reforms is associated with a 
reduction in aggregate growth. In contrast, employment reallocation towards formal activities in Brazil is 
increasing aggregate growth after 2000.  
This shows the importance of using detailed industry data to analyse structural change as the standard 
decomposition method is quite sensitive to the level of aggregation. We extend the decomposition 
method to show formally that by relying on aggregate sector data only, reallocation effects can be 
substantially over- or underestimated. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
discusses the main issues in constructing the harmonized BRIC dataset, relegating a detailed description 
of sources and methods by country to a data appendix. The decomposition method to measure the 
contribution of sectors to growth is presented in section 3. Section 4 discusses trends in production 
structures and presents decomposition results by country. In section 5, we account for employment 
reallocation across formal and informal activities in decomposing growth for Brazil and India. Section 6 




 2. SECTOR DATABASE FOR THE BRIC COUNTRIES 
In this section we discuss the general approach in constructing a database that provides time-series on 
value added, price deflators, and employment by sector, following the methodology developed by 
Timmer and de Vries (2009), also used by McMillan and Rodrik (2011). The database is constructed on 
the basis of an in-depth study of available statistical sources. National data is harmonized in terms of 
industry classifications. The classification list has 35 sectors based on the International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC) revision 3 shown in table 1. Data series are annual and run from 1980 to 
2008 for Brazil, from 1995 to 2008 for Russia, from 1981 to 2008 for India, and from 1987 to 2008 for 
China. 
Gross value added in current and constant prices is taken from the national accounts of the various 
countries. In recent years, value added series have been compiled according to the 1993 United Nations 
System of National Accounts (UN SNA, see UN (1993)). Therefore, international comparability is high, in 
principle. However, the national statistical office of China only proceeded to change its statistical 
procedures from a Material Product System (MPS) to the UN SNA in 1992. And although in Russia the 
statistical office adopted the UN SNA in the early 1990s, a UN SNA consistent set of industry data is only 
presented from 2002 onwards. The shift from the MPS to the UN SNA has been gradual in China and 
Russia. Some elements of the MPS are still visible, such as the grouping and treatment of services into 
material product and non-material product services in the China Statistical Yearbook. Beside these 
major shifts in the statistical system of Russia and China, national statistical institutes frequently change 
methodologies as well. In the national accounts, GDP series are periodically revised which includes 
changes in the coverage of activities (for example after a full economic census has been carried out and 
“new” activities have been discovered), changes in the methods of calculation, and changes in base year 
of the prices used for calculating volume growth rates. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Changes in the methodology and statistical system introduce breaks in the time series. Our general 
approach to solve this issue, is to start with GDP levels for the most recently available benchmark year, 
expressed in that year’s prices, from the national accounts provided by the national statistical institute 
or central bank. Historical national accounts series are subsequently linked to this benchmark year using 
an overlapping year between the old and the new series. This linking procedure ensures that growth 
rates of individual series are retained although absolute levels are adjusted according to the most recent 
information and methods. 
Employment series are typically not part of the core set of national account statistics put out by national 
statistical institutes. Usually, only total employment is available from the national accounts. To arrive at 
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sector-level data, additional material has been collected from population censuses, and employment 
and labour force statistics. For each country, a choice was made of the best statistical source for 
consistent employment data at the industry level.  
For Brazil, employment series are an integral part of the input-output framework and these series 
include own-account workers. Therefore, we use the detailed employment data from the input-output 
tables as the main source. The main source for employment series in Russia is the system of national 
accounts employment statistics, which provides full-time equivalent jobs by one-digit sectors for the 
period from 2003 to 2008. For disaggregation and backward extrapolation of employment series to 1995, 
we used the Balance of Labour Force, the Full Circle Employment Survey, and the Labour Force Survey 
for particular industries.  
Employment data for India is based on the Employment and Unemployment Surveys from the National 
Sample Survey Organization. The employment definition used is the ‘usual principal and subsidiary 
status’. This definition is to a large extent comparable over the various rounds of the survey, and has a 
wide acceptance as a measure of employment (Bosworth and Collins, 2008). In addition, this 
employment definition is used in the national account statistics for India. In our opinion, the 
employment data that we use for India is the best available, but it should be noted that the quality and 
reliability of employment data for India is intensively discussed and subject to great scrutiny (see the 
data appendix for an extensive discussion). Finally, employment series by three broad sectors for China 
are from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook. Detailed industrial employment series for 35 
industries are based on various issues of the China Industrial Economic Statistics Yearbook and the China 
Labour Statistical Yearbook. The more detailed industry data is made consistent with the aggregate 
three-sector data by taking into account the discrepancies between employment statistics in regular 
reports and population censuses. Therefore, the three sector employment data for China and India 
match with those used by Bosworth and Collins (2008).  
Employment in our data set is defined as ‘all persons employed’, including all paid employees, but also 
informal workers such as own-account workers and employers of informal firms. The inclusion of own-
account workers is crucial for the measurement of productivity levels in developing countries (McMillan 
and Rodrik, 2011).3 It is especially important for industries which have a large share of self-employed 
workers, such as agriculture, low-skilled manufacturing, trade, business and personal services. In section 
5, we specifically aim to distinguish between formal and informal activities within sectors. A detailed 
description of the sources and methods on a country-by-country basis is provided in the data appendix. 
 
3. STRUCTURAL DECOMPOSITION METHOD 
To measure the contribution of structural change to growth, we start with the canonical decomposition 
originating from Fabricant (1942). The change in aggregate labour productivity levels (ΔP) can be written 
as: 
∆  ∑ ∆ i 	 
,      (1) 
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with i  the average share of sector i in overall employment, and R the reallocation term. In equation (1), 
the change in aggregate productivity is decomposed into within-sector productivity changes (the first 
term on the right-hand side which we call the “within-effect” (also known as “intra-effect”), and the 
effect of changes in the sectoral allocation of labour which we call the “reallocation -effect”, (the second 
term, also known as the “shift-effect” or “structural-change effect”). The within-effect is positive 
(negative) when the weighted change in labour productivity levels in sectors is positive (negative). The 
reallocation-effect is a residual term, which measures the contribution of labour reallocation across 
sectors, being positive (negative) when labour moves from less (more) to more (less) productive sectors. 
One advantage of this approach above partial analyses of productivity performance within individual 
sectors is that it accounts for aggregate effects. For example, a high rate of productivity growth within 
say manufacturing can have ambiguous implications for overall economic performance if 
manufacturing’s share of employment shrinks rather than expands. If the displaced labour ends up in 
activities with lower productivity, economy-wide growth will suffer. It should be noted that this 
reallocation term is only a static measure of the allocation effect as it depends on differences in 
productivity levels across sectors, not growth rates. Growth and levels are often, but not necessarily, 
correlated. 4  The reallocation term is often used as an indicator for the success of structural 
transformation (e.g. Bosworth and Collins, 2008; IADB, 2010; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). 5   
One aim of this paper is to investigate whether the reallocation term is affected by a change in the level 
of aggregation used in the decomposition. Typically, decompositions are carried out at the level of broad 
sectors. This paper uses a more detailed dataset finding different decomposition results. For example, 
aggregate trends in manufacturing might hide considerable variation at a lower level. Aggregate 
manufacturing productivity growth might be the result of a shrinking formal sector, outsourcing labour-
intensive activities to small informal firms. This effect is picked up as a negative reallocation effect in our 
more detailed decomposition analysis, but not by an analysis based on aggregate manufacturing data. 
Structural change will be growth-reducing when the shift of labour from formal to informal activities is 
properly accounted for. In Section 5 we will show that this is indeed the case for India after the reforms. 
More formally, let each sector i consists of a number of subsectors j. As before, for each sector i the 
change in labour productivity is given by a weighted growth of subsectors j, with share of j in i 
employment as weights, and a residual term measuring the reallocation across industries in a sector i 
(Ri): 
∆  ∑ ∆ i,j 	 
  ,    (2) 
where i,j is the average share of subsector j in sector i employment Substituting equation (2) in 
equation (1), it is easily shown that the change in aggregate productivity can be decomposed in an 
employment weighted change of productivity levels in all subsectors j plus a new reallocation term: 
∆  ∑ ∆j 	 ∑ 
 i 	 
,    (3) 
where   is the average share of subsector j in overall employment. Formula (3) shows that the new 
overall reallocation effect consists of the reallocation of labour between sectors i (the old R), and the 
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reallocation effects between subsectors j within each sector i (Ri summed over all sectors). In the 
example above, Ri is negative for manufacturing bringing down the overall reallocation effect. This 
indicates the importance of having a detailed sector database to analyse the role of structural change in 
economic growth, not only in theory but also empirically as we will argue in the next sections. 
 
4. STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE BRIC COUNTRIES 
We combine the sector database with the decomposition method to examine the contribution of 
structural change to productivity growth. We first aggregate the data to 3 broad sectors (agriculture, 
industry, and services; see last column in table 1 for classification) and apply formula (3), and do the 
same for the full 35 sector detail. In section 5 we additionally distinguish between formal and informal 
activities within sectors before applying the decomposition. Descriptive statistics on production and 
employment structures, as well as decomposition results are presented by country. We follow the BRIC 
acronym in chronological order and observe that productivity growth rates steadily rise as we move 
from Brazil (1.1 per cent average annual since 1995) via Russia (4.4 per cent since 1995) and India (4.7 
per cent since 1991) to China (8.7 per cent annually since 1997). 
 
(a) Brazil 
Table 2 shows a drop in agricultural employment shares in Brazil, falling from about 38 per cent of total 
employment in 1980 to 18 per cent in 2008. Declining agricultural employment shares are a common 
feature across growing economies. In Brazil, labour moves to services industries, which contrasts with 
the experience of China (see below) and past developments in US, Europe and Japan where agricultural 
workers moved mainly to manufacturing (Kuznets, 1966). More industry detail can be found in Appendix 
table 1. It indicates notable increases in employment shares in retail trade (from 6 to 12 per cent of total 
employment), business services (from 6 to 9 per cent), education (from 3 to 6 per cent), and public 
administration (from 3 to 5 per cent).  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
At the same time, productivity levels differ sharply across sectors (see last three columns in table 2, as 
well as the last three columns in appendix table 1). In 1980, the agricultural productivity level was 13 per 
cent of total economy level, whereas services were at 167 per cent of the average productivity level. 
Over time, productivity growth in agriculture was fast, which can be observed from the increase in the 
relative productivity level of agriculture, rising from 13 to 36 per cent, whereas services productivity 
growth was slow. High productivity growth in agriculture is partly related to advancements in farm 
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yields as well as a reduction in surplus labour (disguised unemployment) from the movement of workers 
to services (Baer, 2008).  
In table 3, we show the decomposition results from applying equation (3) to the 3 broad sector database, 
and the 35 detailed sector database. Note that we first aggregate data to a particular level (e.g. 3 or 35 
sectors) before applying the decomposition.6  As argued in section 3, a decomposition analysis with 
more detailed data may result in a different contribution of structural change to growth. Decomposition 
results are shown for the period from 1980 to 1995 and from 1995 to 2008.7  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
For the period from 1980 to 1995, average annual productivity growth was -0.9 per cent. The ‘lost 
decade’ of Latin America actually lasted one and a half decade in Brazil, which is particularly reflected in 
negative productivity growth rates in services (-2.0 and -1.6 percentage points contributions at the 3-
sector and 35-sector level respectively). Nevertheless, the movement of workers towards services which 
had an above-average productivity level is associated with a positive reallocation effect, amounting to 
1.1 percentage points at the 3-sector level. After 1995, when the government managed to control 
inflation in its Plano Real (see also footnote 9), productivity growth became positive in all sectors. 
Appendix table 1 suggests that productivity growth was particularly high in agriculture and mining, 
which is related with the commodity boom, but also in chemical manufacturing and financial services. 
For the period from 1995 to 2008 we again find a large contribution from employment reallocation to 
services (0.6 percentage points), explaining about halve of aggregate growth.  
However, in the latter period, sector trends obscure subsector trends. The reallocation term drops to 0.1 
percentage points when decomposing growth at the 35-sector level rather than the 3-sector level. 
Although the productivity level in overall services is above average (see Table 2), this is not true for all 
services sub-sectors. In particular, within the services sector labour moves to subsectors such as retail 
trade and renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities which have below-average 
productivity levels (see Appendix Table 1). Hence the reallocation effect becomes much smaller in the 
analysis of detailed sub-sectors. At first sight, this result confirms and strengthens the findings by IADB 
(2010) and McMillan and Rodrik (2011) that structural change was not conducive to growth in Brazil 
since 1995. However, in section 5 we show that once making also a distinction between formal and 
informal activities this no longer holds true for the most recent period after 2000.   
  
(b) Russia 
Any analysis of Russian structural change requires detailed knowledge of the treatment of oil and gas 
activities in the national accounts. Exports of oil and gas are about 20 per cent of GDP during the past 
decade, but in the national accounts the oil and gas sector accounts only for about 10 per cent of GDP. 
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This puzzling observation is due to transfer pricing where large Russian oil companies use trading 
companies to bring their output to market (Gurvich, 2004; Kuboniwa et al., 2005). Because of transfer 
pricing schemes, the value added in wholesale trade is overestimated, while underestimated in mining. 
We therefore introduce a new sector consisting of mining and wholesaling, alongside agriculture, 
industry (excl. mining), and services (excluding wholesaling).     
In table 4, production structures of Russia’s economy in 1995 and 2008 are shown. Russia is the only 
BRIC country where the employment share in manufacturing declines after 1995. Workers move from 
agriculture and manufacturing towards mining and services. In appendix table 2, we find a large decline 
in the employment share in heavy manufacturing such as machinery equipment, whereas large gains are 
observed in retail and wholesale trade, as well as public administration. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
To measure the contribution of sectors to growth, we decompose aggregate productivity growth from 
1995 to 2008. Results are shown in table 5. Applying the decomposition formula to the dataset with 4 or 
35 sectors hardly affects the reallocation term. In both cases, employment reallocation contributes 
about 1 percentage point to growth, which is due to the above-average productivity levels in the 
expanding services sectors.  
Perhaps surprisingly, productivity improvements in mining and wholesale are not the main driver of 
economic growth, accounting for 0.3-0.4 percentage points of growth.8 Given that mining activities and 
wholesale trade services encompass more than those related to oil and gas only, we consider this an 
upper bound for the contribution of oil and gas to Russia’s economic growth. Rather, productivity 
improvements within industrial sectors (notably food, beverages, and tobacco manufacturing, and basic 
metals and fabricated metal manufacturing) and services sectors (renting of machinery and equipment 
and other business services) mainly account for aggregate productivity growth. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
(c) India 
Scholars of Indian economic development typically analyse growth rates before and after the reforms in 
the early 1990s as we will do here (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005). The underlying political and 
institutional forces of India’s GDP growth and its acceleration after the reforms are well documented in 
the literature (see e.g. Bhagwati, 1993; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005). From 1981 to 1991, annual 
productivity growth averaged about 3 per cent. In the post-reform period, growth accelerated to 4.7 per 
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cent annually. Table 6 shows employment shares and relative productivity levels. Since 1981, the 
agricultural employment share steadily declined from 70 per cent in 1981 to 54 per cent in 2008. 
Workers moved to both industrial and services sectors (see also Kochar et al., 2006).  
After the reforms, we observe fast increase in employment shares in construction, telecommunications 
and business services, driven by privatization, foreign investment and global outsourcing trends (Kochar 
et al., 2006). In contrast, manufacturing employment is rather constant with little structural change 
within; except for the increase in textile manufacturing employment shares (see appendix table 3 and 
Dougherty (2008) for a discussion).  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
In table 7, decomposition results are presented using the sector database at the 3 and 31 sector level.9 
Indian productivity growth after the reforms is mainly driven by the expansion in the services sector 
which is characterized by above-average productivity levels. In both periods, structural change accounts 
for about 1 percentage point of aggregate productivity change. If we decompose growth using the 31 
sector detail, the contribution of reallocation increases almost another halve percentage point. These 
findings are consistent with Bosworth and Collins (2008), and confirm the findings of McMillan and 
Rodrik (2011): the contribution of structural change in Asian countries such as India (and China, see 
below) is much higher than in Latin American countries such as Brazil. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
(d) China 
China is the paragon of Asia’s pattern of structural change, where agricultural workers move towards 
manufacturing (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). In table 8, we distinguish the period from 1997 to 2008, 
which broadly corresponds with the public enterprise reforms in 1997 and China’s exchange rate policy 
after its ascension to the WTO in 2001 (Rodrik, 2011).  
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
Data on China’s production structure is shown in table 8, with subsector detail in appendix table 4. 
Decomposition results are shown in table 9.  While broad sectoral trends in China are well understood 
(see e.g. Bosworth and Collins, 2008), detailed sector trends have not been analysed in a comparative 
perspective before, due to a lack of data. First of all, the industrial employment share is much higher in 
China compared to Brazil, Russia, or India, mainly due to manufacturing. In China we observe 
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employment share gains in many manufacturing subsectors: electrical and optical equipment tops the 
list, but manufacturing activities related to wood, pulp, paper, rubber, and plastics increased as well. In 
services, on the other hand, structural change is much slower than in the other countries. The overall 
employment share of services is increasing, but this is highly concentrated in below-average productive 
sectors such as retail trade and other community and personal services. As a result, the reallocation 
effect is not higher than in India or Russia, accounting for about a full percentage point of aggregate 
growth, in line with Bosworth and Collins (2008) and McMillan and Rodrik (2011). Clearly, manufacturing 
is the main contributor to aggregate productivity growth, driven by increasing employment shares of 
high-productive industries such as machinery manufacturing. It is in these industries that China stands 




5. STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN BRAZIL AND INDIA 
In many developing countries, the informal sector accounts for the majority of employment and a 
substantial share of value added (Schneider, 2000). In the extended decomposition method in section 3, 
we have argued that if formal and informal activities within sectors are not distinguished, the role of 
structural change for growth may not be accurately measured. In this section, we explore the role of 
employment allocation across formal and informal activities for growth in Brazil and India.10  
The sector database that we presented in section 2 should be distinguished from the informal sector 
data that we use in this section. Although the term ‘informal sector’ is widely used and studied since the 
first report on informal employment in Kenya by the ILO in 1972 (ILO, 1972), its precise meaning and 
measurement remains subject to controversy (Henley et al. 2009). We take a pragmatic approach and 
rely on the definition of informality used in the country itself for collecting statistics. The common 
definition of the informal sector for India is based on an employment size threshold, where the so-called 
“organized sector” consists of firms employing 10 or more workers using power, and 20 or more 
workers without using power (see the data appendix for further discussion). While formal and informal 
activities in India are classified according to employment size, the activities face a different legal and 
institutional environment. For Brazil, mostly legal definitions of the informal sector are used, and the 
overlap between different definitions is imperfect (Henley et al. 2009). We follow the literature and 
define informal employment according to contract status: a worker is classified as informal if he/she 
does not have a signed labour card (Perry et al. 2007). Also, autonomous workers, comprising own-
account workers and employers of unregistered firms are considered part of the informal sector. Clearly, 
definitions of the informal sector vary between Brazil and India and absolute sizes should not be 
compared. But we can use them to analyse trends, which is what we will do here. We find that in India 
informality is increasing after the reforms reducing aggregate productivity growth, while the opposite is 





For Brazil, consistent time series of formal and informal employment from the national accounts are 
available since 2000. Value added of informal sectors is estimated using income per worker ratios from 
surveys of the urban informal economy (Economia Informal Urbana) and household surveys (Pesquisa 
Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios), which is explained in detail in the data appendix. Employment 
shares of informal activities in the overall economy decreased substantially from 62 per cent to 55 per 
cent during the past decade (see table 10). This contrasts with the 1990s for which most researchers 
find that informal employment increased rather than decreased (Schneider, 2000; Menezes-Filho and 
Muendler, 2011).11 Recent formalization of Brazil’s economy might be due to a decline in the interest 
rate and improvements in access to credit, which make it easier and cheaper for firms to borrow (Catão 
et al. 2009).  In addition, Brazil has simplified registration procedures and lowered tax rates for small 
firms in the SIMPLES program (Perry et al., 2007).12 Also government-directed industrial policies provide 
an incentive for firms to formalize in order to be able to win government contracts. As a result, the costs 




Within sectors for which we are able to split formal and informal activities, informal employment is 
largest in agriculture and lowest in public utilities and financial and business services as expected. In all 
sectors, informal employment is going down between 2000 and 2008. In fact, the change in overall 
informal employment is for 77 per cent explained by reallocation towards formal activities within 
sectors.13 Therefore, we expect positive reallocation effects as formal activities have much higher 
productivity levels as compared to informal activities. This is indicated in the last two columns in table 
10 which show the productivity level of informal activities relative to the formal activities within a sector. 
These values are all well below half. It is noteworthy that these ratios are declining over time in most 
sectors, in particular in manufacturing, suggesting an increasing gap in productivity between informal 
and formal activities.   
Decomposition results in table 11 based on equation (3) suggest that after allowing for employment 
reallocation towards formal activities, the positive effects of structural change are much higher. Without 
making the formal/informal split structural change appeared to contribute only a little to aggregate 
productivity growth, as we found before. After taking account of the increasing formalisation, structural 
change contributed more than 1.2 percentage points, effectively explaining all of Brazil’s growth since 
2000. These findings qualify the view by the IADB (2010), and McMillan and Rodrik (2011) that structural 
change has not been growth-enhancing in Brazil. Clearly, employment reallocation towards formal 
activities, in particular in distributive trade and in manufacturing, is contributing to growth.14  
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It remains to be seen whether this process of structural change has long-lasting dynamic effects. So far, 
the trends suggest that only static reallocation gains have been realized as productivity levels in both the 
formal and the informal sector are stagnant or even go down. This suggests a process in which the most 
productive informal entrepreneurs choose to formalize (de Paula and Scheinkman, 2011), with the result 
that productivity levels in both the formal and the informal sector go down. This is reflected in the small 
or even negative contributions of productivity growth within industry and services (see last two columns 
in Table 11). In contrast to China, growth-enhancing structural change in Brazil is not accompanied by 
dynamic productivity growth in industry. This shows that growth-enhancing structural change is 





For India, we have two different data sources that allow us to distinguish between formal and informal 
activities and explore the role of structural change for growth. The national accounts provide time series 
of net domestic product by formal and informal activity for 9 broad sectors. Also, it presents data for 
organized sector by detailed manufacturing industry based on the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). We 
combine both datasets covering 21 sectors of the economy, including 13 manufacturing industries, with 
for each sector a split between formal and informal activities. Informal employment is derived by 
subtracting organized employment from total employment obtained in labour force surveys. This 
residual approach is carried out by sector. Therefore, we use the employment estimates of the national 
sample survey organization only for survey years (hence our period begins in 1993 and ends in 2004, see 
the data appendix for further information).  
In Table 12, we provide the employment shares and relative productivity levels of informal activities in 
India by broad sector. The first two columns in Table 12 show that in contrast to Brazil, the share of 
informal employment in India increased. Also, within almost all manufacturing industries the share of 
informal employment was rising (Kulshreshtha, 2011), which is partly related to labour market rigidities 
that prevented modern manufacturing from expanding employment opportunities (Pieters et al., 2011). 
At the same time, the last two columns show productivity levels of the unorganized sector in India are 
lagging behind the organized sector and the gap is widening over time, as in Brazil. This might lead to an 







Using the 21-sector data without a formal-informal split, we find that between 1993 and 2004, 
structural change was growth-enhancing, contributing 1.1 percentage points to aggregate productivity 
growth (see Table 13), reflecting our earlier findings in Table 7. However, when splitting each sector into 
a formal and informal part, the contribution of structural change drops to zero. This suggests increasing 
dualism in the Indian economy with high productivity levels and growth rates in the formal sector, partly 
achieved by economizing on the use of labour through outsourcing labour-intensive activities to small 
informal firms (Pieters et al., 2011). And while informal employment is increasing, productivity growth in 
that sector is stagnating, leading to growth-reducing structural change. In this case, the sectoral 
productivity growth is less than the weighted sum of formal and informal productivity growth rates. This 
effect is picked up as a negative reallocation effect in our more detailed decomposition analysis, but not 
by an analysis based on aggregate data. Also within manufacturing a similar growth-reducing structural 
change is to be seen (results available upon request), in particular in transport manufacturing, where 
informality is growing rapidly.  
At the very least the results in this section suggest that decompositions of growth should carefully 
consider the role of employment reallocation across formal and informal activities. Aggregate 
productivity growth trends hide the growth-enhancing effects of a shift away from informal low-
productive activities as in Brazil, and the growth-reducing role of reallocation of employment to 
informality in India. 
 
[Table 13 here] 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
New structural economists reinvigorate the argument that the nature and speed of structural 
transformation is a key factor in explaining economic growth (Lin, 2011). Rodrik and McMillan (2011) 
argue that structural change is growth-enhancing in Asia, whereas it is growth-reducing in Africa and 
Latin America. However, empirical analysis of structural change in developing countries has been based 
on aggregated sector data (e.g. Bosworth and Collins, 2008; IADB, 2010; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011), 
which may hide diverging trends at a more detailed level and thereby obscure a proper assessment of 
the role of structural transformation for aggregate productivity growth. 
This paper studied patterns of structural change and productivity growth in four major developing 
countries since the 1980s, the BRIC countries, using a newly constructed detailed sector database. Based 
on a structural decomposition, we find that for China, India and Russia reallocation of labour across 
sectors is contributing to aggregate productivity growth, whereas in Brazil it is not. This strengthens the 
findings of McMillan and Rodrik (2011). However, this result is overturned when a distinction is made 
between formal and informal activities within sectors. Increasing formalization of the Brazilian economy 
since 2000 appears to be growth-enhancing, while in India the increase in informality after the reforms 
is growth-reducing.  
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The case of Brazil shows that growth-enhancing structural change is necessary but not sufficient for 
aggregate productivity growth. The shift of employment from informal to formal activities coincided 
with slow or even negative productivity improvements in formal industry and services. On the other 
hand, in India, informal activities expanded after the reforms, creating more dualism. The expansion of 
the low-productive informal activities was accompanied by dynamic formal activities, especially in the 
manufacturing and business services sector (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2011). India shows that growth-
reducing structural change can go hand-in-hand with productivity improvements within particular 
industries generating high aggregate productivity growth. These divergent growth paths between India 
and Brazil indicate that within- and reallocation-effects have to be considered in combination in any 
analyses of structural change. .  Clearly, these analyses also depend critically on the level of sector detail 
used and should be interpreted with care. 
The new sector database provides a more fine-grained analysis of economic growth and production in 
the BRIC countries. As such, the level of detail in this paper is in between micro (firm-level) analysis and 
macro analysis of growth. A drawback of this approach is that we may still miss out on important 
dynamics within sectors. For example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) explore the productivity distribution of 
firms within detailed manufacturing sectors within India and China and find that resource reallocation 
towards the most productive firms within narrowly defined industries may double productivity. In the 
end though, one is interested in the economy-wide effects of structural change and future empirical 
analysis should aim to analyse the role of resource reallocation for aggregate growth building up from 
the micro-level. The increasing availability of micro data that allow tracking employees across firms (e.g. 
McCaig and Pavcnik (2011) for Vietnam, and Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) for Brazil), opens up a 
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Figure 1. Share of the BRIC countries in world GDP 
Note: Total GDP, in millions of 1990 US$ (converted at Geary Khamis 
























Table 1. Industries that are distinguished in the BRIC sector database  
number ISIC rev. 3 Description 3-sector 
1 AtB Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing Agriculture 
2 C Mining and Quarrying Industry 
3 15t16 Food, Beverages and Tobacco Industry 
4 17t18 Textiles and Textile Products Industry 
5 19 Leather, Leather and Footwear Industry 
6 20 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork Industry 
7 21t22 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing Industry 
8 23 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel Industry 
9 24 Chemicals and Chemical Products Industry 
10 25 Rubber and Plastics Industry 
11 26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Industry 
12 27t28 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Industry 
13 29 Machinery, not elsewhere classified Industry 
14 30t33 Electrical and Optical Equipment Industry 
15 34t35 Transport Equipment Industry 
16 36t37 Manufacturing not elsewhere classified; Recycling Industry 
17 E Electricity, Gas and Water Supply Industry 
18 F Construction Industry 
19 50 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel 
Services 
20 51 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of 
Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
Services 
21 52 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods 
Services 
22 H Hotels and Restaurants Services 
23 60 Inland Transport Services 
24 61 Water Transport Services 
25 62 Air Transport Services 
26 63 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; 
Activities of Travel Agencies 
Services 
27 64 Post and Telecommunications Services 
28 J Financial Intermediation Services 
29 70 Real Estate Activities Services 
30 71t74 Renting of Machinery and Equipment and Other 
Business Activities 
Services 
31 L Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social 
Security 
Services 
32 M Education Services 
33 N Health and Social Work Services 
34 O Other Community, Social and Personal Services Services 





Table 2. Employment shares and relative productivity levels in Brazil 
1980 1995 2008   1980 1995 2008 
  Li Li Li   RPi RPi RPi 
Agriculture 38% 26% 18%   0.13 0.22 0.36 
Industry 23% 20% 21%   1.33 1.39 1.32 
 Services 39% 54% 61%   1.67 1.23 1.07 
All sectors 100% 100% 100%   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Note: Li refers to the employment share of sector i. Numbers may not sum due 
to rounding. RPi refers to the productivity level of sector i relative to the total 
economy productivity level. Source: authors calculations using the sector 
database. Full 35-sector detail is shown in appendix table 1. 
 
 
Table 3. Structural transformation and Aggregate Productivity Growth in Brazil 
  1995-2008 1995-2008   1980-95 1980-95 
  3-sector 35-sector   3-sector 35-sector 
Contribution of productivity growth in:           
          Agriculture 0.3% 0.3%   0.2% 0.2% 
          Industry 0.2% 0.2%   -0.2% -0.2% 
          Services 0.1% 0.5%   -2.0% -1.6% 
     All sectors (1) 0.6% 1.0%   -2.0% -1.6% 
Reallocation (2) 0.6% 0.1%   1.1% 0.8% 
Aggregate productivity growth (3) = (1) +(2) 1.1% 1.1%   -0.9% -0.9% 
Note: Aggregate productivity growth is the average annual logarithmic growth rate. Numbers may 
not sum due to rounding. Source: authors calculations using the sector database and equation (3). 
 
 
 Table 4. Employment shares and relative productivity levels in Russia 
1995 2008   1995 2008 
  Li Li   RPi RPi 
Agriculture 28% 21%   0.26 0.20 
Mining and Wholesale trade 6% 9%   3.54 2.47 
Industry 27% 23%   1.13 1.13 
 Services 40% 46%   1.06 1.02 
All sectors 100% 100%   1.00 1.00 
Note: Li refers to the employment share of sector i. Numbers may not sum 
due to rounding. RPi refers to the productivity level of sector i relative to the 
total economy productivity level. Source: authors calculations using the 







Table 5. Structural transformation and Aggregate Productivity Growth in Russia 
1995-2008 1995-2008 
  4-sector 35-sector 
Contribution of productivity growth in:     
          Agriculture 0.1% 0.1% 
          Mining and Wholesale trade 0.3% 0.4% 
          Industry 1.2% 1.1% 
          Services 1.8% 1.7% 
     All sectors (1) 3.5% 3.4% 
Reallocation (2) 0.9% 1.0% 
Aggregate productivity growth (3) = (1) +(2) 4.4% 4.4% 
Note: Aggregate productivity growth is the average annual logarithmic growth 
rate. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. Source: authors calculations using 
the sector database and equation (3). 
 
 
  Table 6. Employment shares and relative productivity levels in India 
1981 1991 2008   1981 1991 2008 
  Li Li Li   RPi RPi RPi 
Agriculture 70% 64% 54%   0.52 0.46 0.30 
Industry 13% 16% 20%   1.87 1.69 1.33 
 Services 17% 21% 26%   2.20 2.13 2.20 
All sectors 100% 100% 100%   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Note: Li refers to the employment share of sector i. Numbers may not sum due 
to rounding. RPi refers to the productivity level of sector i relative to the total 
economy productivity level. Source: authors calculations using the sector 









 Table 7. Structural transformation and Aggregate Productivity Growth in India 
1991-2008 1991-2008   1981-1991 1981-1991 
  3-sector 31-sector   3-sector 31-sector 
Contribution of productivity growth in:           
         Agriculture 0.5% 0.5%   0.5% 0.5% 
          Industry 0.9% 1.0%   0.5% 0.2% 
          Services 2.5% 1.9%   1.1% 0.8% 
     All sectors (1) 3.8% 3.4%   2.1% 1.5% 
Reallocation (2) 0.9% 1.3%   0.9% 1.4% 
Aggregate productivity growth (3) = (1) +(2) 4.7% 4.7%   3.0% 3.0% 
Note: Aggregate productivity growth is the average annual logarithmic growth rate. Numbers may not 
sum due to rounding. Source: authors calculations using the sector database and equation (3). 
 
 
 Table 8. Employment shares and relative productivity levels in China 
1987 1997 2008   1987 1997 2008 
  Li Li Li   RPi RPi RPi 
Agriculture 59% 51% 40%   0.51 0.35 0.23 
Industry 23% 23% 27%   1.59 2.14 2.06 
 Services 18% 26% 33%   1.88 1.24 1.07 
All sectors 100% 100% 100%   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Note: Li refers to the employment share of sector i. Numbers may not sum due to 
rounding. RPi refers to the productivity level of sector i relative to the total economy 
productivity level. Source: authors calculations using the sector database. Full 35-
sector detail is shown in appendix table 4. 
 
Table 9. Structural transformation and Aggregate Productivity Growth in China 
1997-2008 1997-2008   1987-1997 1987-1997 
  3-sector 35-sector   3-sector 35-sector 
Contribution of productivity growth in:           
         Agriculture 0.6% 0.6%   0.9% 0.9% 
          Industry 4.4% 4.6%   4.6% 4.5% 
          Services 2.5% 2.6%   1.2% 1.5% 
     All sectors (1) 7.5% 7.9%   6.7% 6.8% 
Reallocation (2) 1.2% 0.8%   1.0% 0.9% 
Aggregate productivity growth (3) = (1) +(2) 8.7% 8.7%   7.7% 7.7% 
Note: Aggregate productivity growth is the average annual logarithmic growth rate. Numbers may not 




 Table 10. Employment shares and relative productivity levels of informal 
activities within sectors in Brazil 
2000 2008 2000 2008 
  ILi ILi RPIFi RPIFi 
Agriculture 90% 86% 0.09 0.11 
Mining 51% 34% 0.32 0.18 
Manufacturing 48% 40% 0.33 0.27 
Public utilities 29% 18% 0.58 0.39 
Construction 82% 74% 0.14 0.16 
Trade, hotels, and restaurants 58% 49% 0.29 0.26 
Transport services 58% 52% 0.28 0.26 
Communication services 68% 66% 0.22 0.22 
Financial and business services 23% 20% 0.40 0.34 
Other services 63% 59% 0.27 0.26 
All sectors 62% 55% 0.27 0.25 
Note: ILi refers to the employment share of informal activities in sector i. 
RPIFi refers to the productivity level of informal activities relative to the 





 Table 11. Structural Change, Formal and Informal Activities, and 
Aggregate Productivity Growth in Brazil 
2000-2008 2000-2008 
  10-sector informal split 
Contribution of productivity growth in:     
          Agriculture 0.33 0.19 
          Industry -0.10 -0.50 
          Services 0.59 0.07 
     All sectors (1) 0.83 -0.24 
Reallocation (2) 0.17 1.24 
Aggregate productivity growth (3) = (1) +(2) 1.00 1.00 
Note: Aggregate productivity growth is the average annual logarithmic 
growth rate. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. Source: authors 







Table 12. Employment shares and relative productivity levels of informal 
activities in India   
  1993 2004 1993 2004 
  Li Li RPIFi RPIFi 
Agriculture 99% 99% 0.06 0.05 
Mining 57% 58% 0.06 0.07 
15t16 83% 88% 0.14 0.10 
17t19 87% 92% 0.12 0.09 
20 98% 99% 0.32 0.10 
21t22 72% 88% 0.15 0.09 
23 58% 49% 0.01 0.01 
24 64% 73% 0.05 0.03 
25 70% 73% 0.28 0.47 
26 88% 92% 0.09 0.06 
27t28 71% 83% 0.13 0.05 
29 73% 77% 0.26 0.20 
30t33 54% 74% 0.37 0.15 
34t35 22% 72% 0.43 0.05 
36t37 98% 97% 0.03 0.03 
Public utilities 29% 36% 0.08 0.09 
Construction 90% 96% 0.12 0.07 
Trade, hotels, and restaurants 99% 99% 0.16 0.05 
Transport and communication 
services 69% 83% 0.33 0.32 
Financial and business services 55% 74% 1.22 0.28 
Other services 64% 72% 0.21 0.15 
All sectors 92% 94% 0.12 0.08 
Note: ILi refers to the employment share of informal activities in sector i. RPIFi 
refers to the productivity level of informal activities relative to the formal 
activities within sector i. Leather and footwear products (19) is included in 











Table 13. Structural Change, Formal and Informal Activities, and Aggregate 
Productivity Growth in India 
1993-2004 1993-2004 
  21-sector informal split 
Contribution of productivity growth in:     
          Agriculture 0.3% 0.3% 
          Industry 0.8% 1.4% 
          Services 1.6% 2.1% 
     All sectors (1) 2.7% 3.8% 
Reallocation (2) 1.1% 0.0% 
Aggregate productivity growth (3) = (1) +(2) 3.8% 3.8% 
Note: Aggregate productivity growth is the average annual logarithmic 
growth rate. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. Source: authors 
















DATA APPENDIX. SOURCES AND METHODS BY COUNTRY 
Each BRIC country has a long history in collecting statistics, and while the system of national accounts 
provides a unifying framework, approaches vary across countries and over time. Therefore, we discuss 
sources and methods used to construct the sector database by country. We also discuss the estimation 
of formal and informal employment and value added, which is not part of the sector database.   
 
(a) Brazil 
For Brazil, recent time-series data of value added in current and constant prices are obtained from the 
national accounts at IBGE. These series have the 2000 population census as the reference year.15 The 
industry classification of Brazil (CNAE 1.0) matches closely with the 35 industries distinguished in this 
paper, except for several services industries. For splitting up these services industries we use value 
added shares from annual firm-level surveys from the statistical office. We split up distributive trade 
industries using the pesquisa anual de comércio. To separate transportation services from business 
services and personal and community services, we use the value added shares from the pesquisa anual 
de serviços.16 Because for current prices extra detail was added, aggregate price deflators are assumed 
to be identical for more disaggregated industries.  
The national accounts provide employment by industry as well. These occupational employment series 
are an integral part of the supply and use table framework used by the statistical office, and the series 
include informal and own-account workers (IBGE, 2008). The integration of value added and 
employment ensures internal consistency in the time series for Brazil. Similar to value added series, we 
split up distributive trade industries using employment shares from the pesquisa anual de comércio, and 
separate transportation services from business services and personal and community services using 
shares from the pesquisa anual de serviços.  
Additional detailed employment data is available from the national account statistics, which allows a 
distinction between formal and informal employment, for the period from 2000 to 2008. We follow 
most of the literature on informality in Brazil, and define informal employment according to contract 
status: a worker is classified as informal if he/she does not have a signed labour card (Perry et al. 2007). 
Also, autonomous workers, comprising own-account workers and employers of unregistered firms are 
considered part of the informal sector.17 Next, we multiply the number of employees without a labour 
card with an estimate of the average yearly income from the annual household survey (Pesquisa 
Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios, PNAD) for 2003. Profits of autonomous workers are obtained from 
the 2003 survey of the urban informal sector (Economia Informal Urbana, ECINF). These profits are a 
weighted average of the monthly profits for own-account workers and employers of unregistered 
firms.18 Combining the income of workers without a signed labour card with the profits of own-account 
workers and employers of registered firms provides an estimate of informal sector GDP. For other years, 
we assume the ratio of nominal income per worker is fixed. The imputation is similar to that of India’s 
statistical office, where for various sectors (but not all sectors) ratios of value added per worker are used 
to estimate domestic product (Kulshreshtha, 2011). To provide some indication of our estimates: for 
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2003 the share of the informal sector in total GDP is estimated at 28.2 per cent, which is comparable to 
the 28.4 per cent estimate of informal sector’s GDP share in Brazil for the early 2000s by Vuletin (2009), 
but lower compared to the 39.8 per cent share for 1999/2000 by Schneider (2000).  
 
(b) Russia 
Value added series for Russia, following the UN SNA industry classification up to the level of four digits, 
are available from 2002 onwards at the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation 
(Rosstat). Before 2002, official output series are available in the Soviet classification (the All-Union 
Classification of the Industries of the National Economy, OKONKh). However, Rosstat collected the 
primary data for 2003-2004 using both the old and new industry classification.19 This facilitates the 
transition from one system to the other as it allows linking the value added series. A detailed discussion 
of the matching procedure due to the change in industry classification is provided in Timmer and 
Voskoboynikov (2011). Value added series are deflated using physical volume series.  
The main source for employment series in Russia is the system of national accounts employment 
statistics, which provides full-time equivalent jobs by one-digit sectors for the period from 2003-2008. 
Importantly, this source includes households that produce goods and services for own consumption. In 
Russia, the share of hours worked from these activities by households is estimated at about 12-15 per 
cent of total hours worked, and 57.8 per cent of total hours worked in agriculture (Rosstat, 2009). For 
disaggregation and backward extrapolation of employment series to 1995, we used the balance of 
labour force, the full circle employment survey, and the labour force survey for particular industries. 
 
(c) India 
Value added series for India are obtained from the national account statistics available at the central 
statistical organization. The most recent version of national accounts ‘back-series’, which provides long 
time-series data consistent with the latest vintage of GDP, are used. However, this requires splitting 
some industries as the national accounts classification is not fully consistent with ISIC rev. 3.1. To split up 
some of the manufacturing industries, information from the annual survey of industries (for the formal 
sector), and the national sample survey organizations’ survey on unorganized manufacturing (for the 
informal sector) are used.20 The approach assures that aggregate values are consistent with those 
reported in the national accounts. National account statistics provides output net of financial 
intermediation services indirectly measured for some sectors at a more aggregate level. For consistency 
of the value added series with the other BRIC countries, we allocated these intermediation services 
across sectors proportional to their shares in GDP. 
Comprehensive statistics on employment in India are relatively less frequent compared to other 
economic variables such as output or value added. In addition, the quality of available employment data 
in India is widely discussed among Indian researchers (see Himanshu, 2011; Unni and Raveendran 2007; 
Sundaram and Tendulkar 2004 among others) and consequently there has been an improvement in the 
30 
 
quality of employment statistics over time. Nevertheless, by now, it is widely acknowledged that the 
quality of the data is still inadequate (Srinivasan, 2010).21 In this paper, we try to estimate employment 
by industries in a more consistent way, making use of several available sources on employment in India. 
Two major sources of employment data by industries covering the entire economy are the decennial 
population censuses and the Employment and Unemployment Surveys of the National Sample Survey 
Organization (NSSO). Recently, India also brings out an economic census which also provides 
employment data during successive economic censuses. Other sources, which cover only selected 
segments of the economy, includes the Directorate General of Employment and Training (DGET), NSSO 
surveys on unregistered manufacturing, and the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI).  The existence of 
multiple sources of data, nevertheless, hardly helps make a meaningful comparison across sources or 
over time, as they differ in coverage, sectors and more importantly worker definitions and frequency of 
availability (see Srinivasan, 2010). For instance the population census conducted once in ten years, 
provides employment numbers by industries, while the NSSO surveys conducted once in 5 years 
provides work participation rates under different definitions, which are not strictly comparable with the 
census definition. While the DGET and ASI estimates are available annually only for the organized 
segments of the economy, which constitutes only a minor part of the aggregate economic activity, the 
Census and NSSO covers all segments of economic activity. 
While questions are raised about the methodology and often the observed trends in employment in the 
data, most researchers implicitly acknowledge the fact that the NSSO “quinquennial surveys provide 
perhaps the only comprehensive database on employment in the country” (Rangarajan et al., 2011).  
Given the absence of a better alternative, we also largely depend upon the NSSO employment surveys in 
the employment series for India. Fortunately, the concepts used in the consecutive NSSO surveys since 
the 1970s has remained almost the same, making inter-temporal comparison relatively feasible. NSSO 
provides the share of workers in different segments of the economy in total population. This 
information, along with population figures from decennial population census is used to derive the 
number of workers in any given industry.  
NSSO defines work as any activity perused for income (pay, profit or family gain), thus including any 
economic activity that results in the production of goods and services.  It provides employment data 
under three major definitions; 1) Usual Principal Status (UPS); 2) Current Weekly Status (CWS); and 3) 
Current Daily Status (CDS). While the UPS considers a person as employed depending on the activity 
pursued by him/her for the major part of the previous year, the CWS considers her employed if she has 
worked even for one hour during the previous week Under the CDS approach each day of the seven days 
preceding date of survey is considered as the reference period. A person is considered to be working for 
the entire day, if she had worked at least for four hours during the day. Among these concepts the Usual 
Status is the most liberal and widely used concepts (Aggarwal, 2004). We take the employment under 
the ‘usual principal and subsidiary status’ (UPSS) definition. This includes all persons who worked for at 
least 30 days during the past year. The employment definition is to a large extent comparable over the 
various rounds of the survey, and has a wider acceptance as a measure of employment (Bosworth and 
Collins, 2008). In addition, this employment definition is used in the national account statistics for India. 
We use the various quinquennial major rounds of the EUS from the 38th (1983) to the 61st (2004/05) to 
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generate employment for these years. This series of employment is comprehensive in that it is inclusive 
of casual workers, regular and salaried workers and self-employed workers.  
As is evident from the discussion above, there is no time-series data on employment in India, except for 
the organized segments of the economy. ASI provides annual employment data for registered 
manufacturing, and DGET provides the same for all registered segments of the economy, in particular at 
a very detailed level for the recent years. In addition NSSO also provides annual employment data 
derived from a smaller sample of households (see Srivivasan, 2010 for a discussion of these surveys). We 
have explored the possibility of using all these information, whenever appropriate, to derive a time-
series of employment. For instance, we observe that the thin round based annual employment numbers 
are quite volatile, particularly at industry level. It has been often suggested that the use of thin rounds 
may pose little problem if one uses for national aggregate, despite a small sample size resulting in an 
increase in the variance. But this may not be advised at the detailed industry level. 
We obtain time-series of employment for the organized segment of the economy from DGET, and 
calculate the unorganized employment for survey years as a residual (see Sakthivel and Joddar, 2006). 
Subsequently, we linearly interpolate the ratio of unorganized to organized employment, which is used 
to generate time-series of employment in the unorganized sector. The sum of the two for the years in 
between the survey years is the total employment. Here we make an assumption that the ratio of 
unorganized to organized grows linearly between two consecutive survey years. In order to examine 
how sensitive our final results to this assumption, we also generated time-series employment using 
alternative approaches. NSSO also provides wage rates by workers in its employment surveys. Assuming 
that wage rate grows linearly between two consecutive survey years, which is a sensible assumption, we 
imputed annual wage rate. National Accounts provide information on total labour compensation, which 
is divided by the imputed wage rate to obtain implicit employment. Growth rate of these are used to 
interpolate time series of employment for non-survey years.   The results are quite comparable. A caveat 
may be added however. The wage rate based calculation excludes self-employed workers, as NAS 
compensation data does not provide self-employed wages separately. Self-employed workers constitute 
a major chunk of India’s labour force (Srinivasan, 2010). We also explored the possibility of using growth 
rates of annual thin round surveys of NSSO to generate a time-series of employment at the aggregate 
level, and for broad sectors. To accommodate the annual fluctuations from the thin sample, but at the 
same time retain the levels in the major round years, we employ a procedure which uses the movement 
of the thin sample minus the average annual growth rate of the major rounds over the five year periods. 
We observed that the annual fluctuations in the thin round data is remarkably high, even at aggregate 
level, posing doubts about the reliability of this data. We also tried linear interpolation of employment 
to arrive at time-series for years in between successive NSSO rounds. From National Accounts, one can 
obtain industry output, and assuming that labour productivity grows linearly, one can impute 
employment series. Nevertheless, we do not follow this route, as it harms the purpose of conducting a 
proper productivity analysis. 
Estimates of value added for the organized and unorganized sector of India are presented in detailed 
tables underlying the national accounts. We use the official definition of organized (registered) and 
unorganized (unregistered) firms, in order to distinguish between formal and informal sectors. The 
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organized sector consists of firms employing 10 or more workers using power, and 20 or more workers 
without using power. In the national accounts of India, the informal sector is denoted the unorganized 
sector, because of the non-availability of regular accounts (Kulshreshtha, 2011). Time series of net 
domestic product (gross domestic product minus consumption of fixed capital) by broad sectors are 
available from 1980 onwards.22 These estimates are obtained directly from surveys on organized and 
unorganized manufacturing and lately also from surveys of distributive trade firms. For other sectors, 
value added is estimated by multiplying the unorganized labour force by ratios of value added per 
worker, which were obtained from various surveys (Kulshreshtha, 2011). The informal sector 
employment data we use for India are based on a residual approach. We subtract the organized sector 
employment from total employment by sector, itself obtained from NSSO surveys, in order to obtain an 
estimate of unorganized employment. Organized employment estimates are based on the employment 
market information program of the DGET, the ministry of labour. 
 
(d) China 
The value added series by main sector for China are from the China Statistical Yearbook (CSY) (NBS, 
various issues). The CSY provides longitudinal series for five broad sectors of the economy, namely 
agriculture, industry, construction, transportation and commerce, and other services. In addition, the 
CSY provides more detailed information for services industries, but the sum of these industries is not 
consistent with the total. Also, an earlier version of the statistical yearbook (NBS CSY, 2001) shows more 
sectoral detail for services sectors (including employment as well). We adjusted shares, if possible in 
combination with additional information, such that more detailed sectoral series are consistent with the 
totals for services. For detail in manufacturing industries, nominal gross value added by sector is 
obtained from the industrial statistics published in the China Industrial Economic Statistics Yearbook 
(CIESY) by the Department of Industrial and Transportation Statistics, which is part of the National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS).  
In 1992, the NBS switched from the material product system to the system of national accounts. As a 
result, no value added data by sector is available before 1993. However, for the pre-1993 period, 
estimates are available for net value of output. These estimates are compiled following the concepts of 
the material product system. Wu et al. (2008) adjusts net output values by adding back estimated capital 
consumption. Linking the series before 1993 results in intertemporally consistent time series of sectoral 
value added, which is subsequently matched with the total manufacturing sector reported in the 
statistical yearbook. Value added deflators are the implicit deflators reported in the statistical yearbook 
by broad economic sectors. For industrial sectors, producer price indices (PPI) are used to deflate the 
nominal value added. 
Similar to value added, basic employment series by main sectors for China are from various issues of the 
CSY and detailed industrial employment series are from various issues of the CIESY and the China Labour 
Statistical Yearbook (CLSY). These series are not always consistent or reconcilable and contain serious 
breaks.  The three broad-sector series based on population censuses are considered the most consistent 
estimates and used by other scholars such as Bosworth and Collins (2008). But they contain a serious 
break in 1990. As shown in Wu (2011), in 1990, 80.1 million additional employees were reported in the 
1990 Population Census as compared to the annual estimation with the 16-sector breakdown. This 
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break has never been officially explained or adjusted and the 16-sector employment series stopped after 
2002. Wu (2011) found that this break could have emerged in the early 1980s if the 1982 Population 
Census data are used. He argued that the break by nature could have begun in the early 1970s when 
there was a change of the employment policy aiming at relaxing regulations on rural enterprises and 
informal activities. Therefore, his adjustment to the total numbers employed revises the series between 
1982 and 1990 by interpolating the 1982 and 1990 census-based additional employment. The additional 
employment is allocated to major sectors. Based on the existing structure of the five broad sectors, we 
first assume that one-third are engaged in agriculture, none are engaged in non-material/non-market 
services, and the rest are allocated into industry, construction and material services. At detailed industry 
levels in the industrial sector, the CIESY data provide employment data for enterprises at or above the 
“designated size” and the CLSY data provide less detailed data for total employment (including all below 
the “designated size”). The industry data construction follows Wu and Yue (2010) in principle but using 
the above broad-sector estimates in Wu (2011) as control totals. Wu and Yue (2010) use all industry 
level census data, namely, China’s 1985 and 1995 Industrial Censuses and the 2004 and 2008 Economic 
Censuses, to make industry level estimates consistent and then allocate the additional employment 
(below the “size” and outside the “system” or self-employed) into labour-intensive industries only. The 


















 Appendix table 1. Employment shares and relative productivity levels for Brazil 
 
1980 1995 2008   1980 1995 2008 
  Li Li Li   RPi RPi RPi 
AtB 38% 26% 18%   0.13 0.22 0.36 
C 1% 0% 0%   0.99 2.30 3.14 
15t16 2% 2% 2%   1.47 1.28 1.03 
17t18 3% 3% 3%   0.76 0.67 0.50 
19 1% 1% 1%   0.59 0.51 0.27 
20 1% 1% 0%   0.92 0.80 0.61 
21t22 1% 1% 1%   2.00 1.74 2.06 
23 0% 0% 0%   7.63 6.66 6.10 
24 1% 1% 1%   3.87 3.37 5.95 
25 0% 0% 0%   2.22 1.94 1.10 
26 1% 1% 1%   1.35 1.18 1.05 
27t28 1% 1% 1%   2.36 2.06 1.93 
29 1% 1% 1%   2.42 2.11 2.33 
30t33 0% 0% 1%   3.38 2.95 2.49 
34t35 0% 0% 1%   3.47 3.03 3.59 
36t37 1% 1% 1%   1.00 0.88 0.91 
E 1% 0% 0%   1.88 5.29 5.98 
F 9% 6% 7%   0.85 0.92 0.68 
50 1% 2% 2%   1.55 0.91 0.80 
51 1% 2% 2%   2.73 1.61 1.65 
52 6% 11% 12%   1.00 0.59 0.48 
H 2% 4% 4%   0.84 0.49 0.98 
60 2% 3% 3%   1.00 0.97 0.57 
61 0% 0% 0%   5.19 5.07 1.72 
62 0% 0% 0%   3.56 3.47 1.65 
63 1% 1% 1%   1.75 1.70 0.93 
64 0% 0% 0%   2.03 1.98 2.24 
J 1% 1% 1%   9.60 7.32 9.65 
70 1% 1% 1%   9.80 10.70 13.38 
71t74 6% 7% 9%   1.37 1.05 0.85 
L 3% 5% 5%   2.44 2.10 1.67 
M 3% 5% 6%   1.31 1.13 0.77 
N 2% 3% 3%   1.61 1.38 1.14 
O 8% 11% 12%   0.47 0.40 0.35 
P - - -   - - - 
All sectors 100% 100% 100%   1.00 1.00 1.00 
Note: Li refers to the employment share of sector i. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. RPi 
refers to the productivity level of sector i relative to the total economy productivity level. P 




 Appendix table 2. Employment shares and relative productivity levels for Russia 
 
1995 2008   1995 2008 
  Li Li   RPi RPi 
AtB 28% 21%   0.26 0.20 
C 1% 1%   4.49 4.08 
15t16 2% 2%   1.67 1.51 
17t18 2% 1%   0.33 0.33 
19 0% 0%   0.30 0.43 
20 1% 1%   0.80 0.61 
21t22 0% 1%   1.72 1.65 
23 0% 0%   3.62 3.48 
24 1% 1%   1.47 1.66 
25 0% 0%   1.27 1.53 
26 1% 1%   1.04 1.17 
27t28 2% 2%   2.04 1.95 
29 3% 2%   0.49 0.65 
30t33 2% 1%   0.63 0.99 
34t35 2% 2%   1.03 0.77 
36t37 1% 1%   2.81 1.68 
E 2% 2%   2.17 1.11 
F 8% 7%   0.86 0.98 
50 1% 2%   0.53 0.66 
51 4% 8%   3.24 2.23 
52 4% 6%   1.91 1.20 
H 1% 2%   1.40 0.83 
60 4% 4%   1.92 1.54 
61 0% 0%   1.35 1.74 
62 0% 0%   3.05 3.76 
63 1% 1%   3.05 2.01 
64 1% 1%   1.47 1.98 
J 1% 1%   1.89 2.86 
70 2% 1%   0.91 2.38 
71t74 4% 4%   1.23 2.51 
L 3% 5%   1.57 0.59 
M 9% 8%   0.28 0.17 
N 6% 6%   0.48 0.27 
O 3% 3%   0.56 0.38 
P - -   - - 
All sectors 100% 100%   1.00 1.00 
Note: Li refers to the employment share of sector i. Numbers may not sum due to 
rounding. RPi refers to the productivity level of sector i relative to the total 




 Appendix table 3. Employment shares and relative productivity levels for India 
 
1981 1991 2008   1981 1991 2008 
  Li Li Li   RPi RPi RPi 
AtB 69.8% 64.0% 54.0%   0.5 0.5 0.3 
C 0.5% 0.7% 0.6%   3.9 3.5 2.8 
15t16 2.2% 2.3% 2.1%   0.9 0.9 0.8 
17t18 3.4% 3.2% 4.0%   0.9 0.8 0.6 
19 - - -   - - - 
20 1.3% 1.1% 1.2%   0.9 0.5 0.2 
21t22 0.2% 0.3% 0.4%   2.4 2.7 1.1 
23 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   11.7 11.6 29.4 
24 0.3% 0.4% 0.5%   3.9 4.4 5.7 
25 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%   5.0 4.0 1.9 
26 0.9% 0.9% 1.1%   0.7 1.1 0.8 
27t28 0.7% 0.8% 0.9%   3.3 3.1 3.1 
29 0.2% 0.3% 0.3%   5.0 3.0 2.5 
30t33 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%   6.9 5.6 7.7 
34t35 0.2% 0.2% 0.3%   4.7 3.9 3.4 
36t37 0.6% 0.9% 1.2%   0.7 0.4 0.6 
E 0.3% 0.4% 0.3%   6.5 6.8 7.1 
F 1.9% 3.5% 6.7%   2.9 1.5 0.9 
50 0.2% 0.4% 0.6%   2.5 1.6 1.1 
51 0.7% 0.9% 1.4%   4.9 3.8 4.0 
52 4.9% 6.2% 7.8%   1.4 1.2 1.1 
H 0.8% 0.9% 1.4%   0.9 1.0 1.1 
60 2.1% 2.7% 3.9%   2.3 2.0 1.5 
61 - - -   - - - 
62 - - - 
 
- - - 
63 - - - 
 
- - - 
64 0.2% 0.2% 0.5%   5.7 5.4 16.1 
J 0.4% 0.5% 0.7%   7.5 9.6 10.8 
70 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%   187.1 155.5 25.8 
71t74 0.2% 0.3% 1.1%   2.6 2.7 3.6 
L 2.5% 2.9% 1.6%   2.1 2.1 2.8 
M 1.6% 1.7% 2.5%   1.6 1.8 1.4 
N 0.6% 0.6% 0.8%   1.7 2.3 2.3 
O 2.1% 2.6% 2.3%   1.4 1.0 0.8 
P 0.8% 0.6% 1.2%   0.5 0.4 0.2 
All sectors 100% 100% 100%   1.0 1.0 1.0 
Note: Li refers to the employment share of sector i. Numbers may not sum due 
to rounding. RPi refers to the productivity level of sector i relative to the total 
economy productivity level. 19 included in 17t18. 61t63 included in 60. Source: 
authors calculations using the sector database. 
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Appendix table 4. Employment shares and relative productivity levels for China 
 
1987 1997 2008   1987 1997 2008 
  Li Li Li   RPi RPi RPi 
AtB 59.2% 50.5% 40.2%   0.5 0.3 0.2 
C 1.8% 1.8% 1.3%   2.5 2.3 2.5 
15t16 1.7% 1.8% 1.9%   2.0 3.0 2.5 
17t18 2.4% 2.1% 2.8%   1.3 2.0 1.3 
19 0.3% 0.4% 0.8%   0.7 2.0 0.8 
20 0.5% 0.6% 1.3%   0.5 1.6 0.9 
21t22 0.8% 0.7% 1.5%   1.0 2.3 1.1 
23 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%   17.8 7.1 4.8 
24 0.9% 1.1% 1.0%   3.0 3.5 4.4 
25 0.8% 0.9% 1.5%   0.9 2.0 1.0 
26 2.2% 1.9% 1.1%   0.8 2.1 3.0 
27t28 1.3% 1.4% 1.3%   2.5 3.4 4.7 
29 1.9% 1.4% 1.5%   1.1 2.5 3.3 
30t33 0.9% 1.1% 2.0%   1.5 3.5 3.8 
34t35 0.5% 0.7% 0.8%   1.1 3.0 4.7 
36t37 1.6% 1.2% 1.0%   0.3 0.5 0.9 
E 0.3% 0.4% 0.5%   9.2 5.0 5.4 
F 4.5% 5.7% 6.7%   1.4 1.0 0.7 
50 - - -   - - - 
51 1.2% 1.7% 1.8%   8.3 3.7 3.3 
52 3.2% 4.5% 4.9%   0.6 0.3 0.3 
H 1.2% 1.7% 2.5%   1.7 1.1 0.8 
60 1.9% 2.0% 2.4%   1.6 1.8 1.6 
61 0.2% 0.3% 0.2%   2.0 1.9 1.7 
62 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%   2.0 1.9 1.7 
63 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%   2.0 1.9 1.7 
64 0.6% 0.7% 0.9%   0.6 1.7 2.3 
J 0.3% 0.5% 0.6%   13.8 9.4 8.9 
70 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%   51.1 26.9 19.2 
71t74 0.6% 0.5% 0.5%   3.1 4.4 6.2 
L 1.7% 1.7% 1.9%   1.0 1.4 1.1 
M 2.5% 2.5% 2.7%   0.9 0.8 0.7 
N 0.9% 0.7% 0.9%   1.0 1.3 1.2 
O 3.6% 9.0% 12.8%   0.4 0.2 0.1 
P - - -   - - - 
All sectors 100% 100% 100%   1.0 1.0 1.0 
Note: Li refers to the employment share of sector i. Numbers may not sum due to 
rounding. RPi refers to the productivity level of sector i relative to the total economy 
productivity level. 50 partly included in 51 and partly in 52. P included in O. Source: 




                                                            
ENDNOTES TEXT 
1
 For a discussion of policies to promote diversification, see Cimoli et al. (2009) and the symposium around Lin’s 
paper (Lin, 2011) in the World Bank Research Observer. 
2
 The sector database is available to the referees from the authors upon request. The sector database will be 
published online [website not disclosed]. 
3
 To provide some indication on the size of the informal sector, we find in section 5 that the informal share in total 
manufacturing employment is about 48 percent in Brazil in 2000, and 85 percent in India in 2004.  
4
 The decomposition is based on average labor productivity, but ideally should be based on marginal productivity. 
If a production function is Cobb Douglas, the marginal productivity of labor is average productivity times the labor 
share in value added. If labor shares differ across sectors, an analysis based on average productivity may be 
misleading. For example, high average productivity in capital-intensive industries such as petroleum refining (ISIC 
rev. 3, sector 23) and public utilities (ISIC rev. 3, sector E) may simply reflect a low labor share (see appendix table 
1 to 4 for data). We assume that marginal and average productivities have a strong correlation. Mundlak et al. 
(2008) and Gollin et al. (2011) found that differences in average productivity in agriculture and manufacturing are 
related to large gaps in marginal productivity). Similarly, controlling for capital, productivity is higher in formal as 
compared to informal activities (de Vries, 2010) . 
5
 Various decomposition methods have been proposed in the literature. Initial-year, mid-year, or end-year shares 
can be used, with the former typically giving a greater weight to the reallocation-effect as compared to the latter. 
To minimize this index number problem, we use mid-year average employment shares (see Balk (2001) for an 
overview). Alternatively, one can use value added shares as weights instead of employment, as in Bosworth and 
Collins (2008). This approach is less appealing as it does not focus on a reallocation of inputs but of outputs. 
6
 The within-effects by sector and the reallocation effect are multiplied with the period-average annual 
productivity growth rate after the decomposition.  
7
 In the literature on economic growth in Latin America, it is common to analyze growth rates before and after 
1990 since most reforms were implemented around that year (e.g. IADB, 2010; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). For 
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Brazil, however, we prefer to consider the period before and after 1995. Brazil faced a prolonged period of (hyper-) 
inflation from 1986 to 1994, which crippled productivity growth. Only after the successful introduction of the Plano 
Real in 1994 did hyperinflation cede and did productivity growth resume (see Baer (2008) for a discussion of the 
Plano Real). If we consider the same period from 1990 to 2005 at the 35-sector level, as in McMillan and Rodrik 
(2011), we also find that structural change was not conducive for growth in Brazil.  
8
 The 0.4 percentage points contribution in the decomposition with 35 sectors is equally split between mining 
activities (0.20 percentage points) and wholesale trade services (0.24 percentage points). 
9
 For India, industry 19 (Leather and footwear) cannot be separated from 17t18 (Textile and textile products). Also, 
transport services are grouped as 60t63. Therefore, the sector database distinguishes 31 sectors for India. 
10
 Data to split informal and formal activities within sectors is much harder to come by for Russia and China, and 
we therefore restrict our analysis in this section to Brazil and Russia. 
11
 The lack of comparable data on informal employment and value added does not allow us to distinguish between 
formal and informal activities for the 1990s. We expect structural change would lower growth during this period, 
as workers moved towards low-productive informal activities (Menezes-Filho and Muendler, 2011). 
12
 The SIMPLES program was introduced in the mid-1990s and gradually expanded across the Federal states of 
Brazil thereafter. After 2007, a unified tax regime for small firms was introduced, which is known as ‘Super Simples’. 
13
 We decomposed the change in the share of informal workers in total employment between 2000 and 2008 to 
explore the effect of within and between industry shifts. Consider: 
∆        ∑ ∆  	 ∑ ∆ , 
where ILi refers to the employment share of informal activities in sector i, and   refers to the average share of 
sector i’s employment in total employment. The change in overall informal employment is for 77 percent explained 
by the first term.  
14
 Detailed results (not shown) are available from the authors upon request. 
15
 Previously, time-series in Brazil had 1985 as the reference year. Brazil revised its GDP upward following the shift 
to 2000 as the reference year. New activities were discovered in the 2000 population census and the value added 
of several sectors was higher than previously estimated (IBGE, 2006). The statistical office released new time series 
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by industry back to 1995. Employment and value added series for years before 1995 were linked using an 
overlapping year. 
16
 A limitation of using shares from these firm surveys for disaggregation is that informal firms are not included, 
which may bias the more detailed estimates. The surveys have an employment threshold for including firms (e.g. 
20 employees in the case of the pesquisa anual de comércio). Ideally, we would have used information from 
economic censuses that include informal activities. However, Brazil’s latest economic census dates back to 1985 
after which the statistical office started the annual surveys.  
17
 Henley et al. (2009) examine three definitions of the informal sector in Brazil: whether a worker has a signed 
labor card, whether a worker contributes to social security, and whether a worker is employed in a firm with five 
or less employees. We find that informal employment decreased using the first and the second definition. Informal 
employment patterns might be different for the third definition as the SIMPLES program, which simplified and 
lowered taxes for small firms, created the perverse incentive for firms to remain small in order to pay a lower tax 
rate (Perry et al. 2007). 
18
 Profits of autonomous workers are included in Gross Operating Surplus (GOS). If we subtract the income of 
autonomous workers from GOS, the share of GOS in value added drops from 53 percent to 30 percent. A common 
assumption of the capital share in income is 0.3 in macroeconomic models (Jorgenson and Timmer, 2011), thus our 
imputation gains some credibility. 
19
 The Soviet industry classification OKONKh (Obshchesoıu% znaıa% klassifikats%iıa% otrasleı̌ narodnogo khozıa% ı̆stva) 
was developed for the planned economy in line with the concept of material products. The last revision of this 
Soviet classification was introduced in 1976, and is difficult to reconcile with international counterparts. For a 
detailed discussion of the classification, see Masakova (2006). 
20
 The following manufacturing industries were split up: rubber and petroleum products, basic metals and metal 
products and electrical machinery. In addition, some of the service sectors (distributive trade industries, and real 
estate and business services) were split up. The latter was accomplished by using information from recent surveys 
in the case of real estate and business services and additional information underlying Kolli (2009) on the retail 
trade sector.  
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21
 Srinivasan (2010) argues that it is the complexity of Indian labor market such as shifting from self-employment to 
wage employment in off seasons and frequent entry to and exit from the work force that causes much of the 
conceptual, measurement and data gathering problems. 
22
 Excluding consumption of fixed capital from GDP might distort value added shares in favor of informal firms, 
which are usually less capital intensive. We have no data to explore this issue further, but a correction could imply 
that the reallocation effect towards informal manufacturing increases (see section 6). 

